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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
coverage, is now interpreted as embracing the generic category of things
used to support workmen involved in construction, alteration, or repair.
Thus, any device falls within its prohibitions merely upon the intent of
the person in charge that the object be used by the workmen as a support.
Throughout its judicial history, the legislative purpose of protecting
workmen has never fallen from the consciousness of the courts, and it
shall continue to be interpreted accordingly, with most presumptions
geared to the preservation of this valuable cause of action.
Richard Loritz
THE STUDENT AND THE VOTE
Every state in the Union requires that a person maintain a "residence"
in the local election district for a specified length of time before becoming
eligible to vote. If this person is a student receiving a formal education in
the district, he may find unusual difficulty in proving that he has main-
tained proper "residence" when he presents himself to vote. Furthermore,
when an election is contested by appropriate procedure, the contestant
may seek to invalidate the vote of a student at a local institution, con-
tending that the student did not fulfill the "residence" requirement. In
this comment some of the solutions offered by the courts to controversies
such as these will be critically compared with the policy and purpose be-
hind the requirement of "residence." 1
The general public policy behind the election laws of the states is found
in the political bridgework of the Nation. The essence of the republican
form of government that somehow the United States shall guarantee to
every state in the Union is that there be a body of citizens entitled to vote,
in whom the supreme power of government resides to be exercised by
their chosen representatives. The ideals of popular sovereignty and democ-
racy to which this Nation claims to adhere demand that the ballot be
distributed to all members of the governed community. The infusion of
these ideals into the republican government creates a situation in which
the only voter qualification consistent with public policy is one justified
by necessity and reason.
Voter qualification laws traditionally have been of two basic types.
Certain of these laws demand from the prospective voter some objective
assurances of a responsible attitude, such as minimum age or minimum
1 Some of these controversies concern "residence" within the state for the required
time. Other such controversies, where "residence" within the state itself is not ques-
tioned, concern "residence" within the appropriate local political subdivision (e.g.,
election district). The problems are the same for both types of controversy, as well
as for the hybrids.
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literacy. Others demand of the prospective voter some objective mani-
festations of membership in the governed community, such as "resi-
dence."'2
In Dale v. Erwin3 students at Shurtleff College claimed that the labor
that they furnished to satisfy a road tax entitled them to vote. The court
did not consider the road tax as relevant because the statute exacted labor
indiscriminately from all "inhabitants." The court rather considered the
exercise of the vote to be a privilege of the town and said:
One who has a home in a town in this State is, by the laws of the State, liable
to town duties, to be taxed on his personal property, to be enrolled in the mili-
tia, and placed on the jury lists and serve as jurymen, and to be chosen to fill
town or country offices, if of a mature age and possessed of other proper quali-
fications, and he is entitled to all the privileges of the town, and to receive its
support in the event of his becoming a pauper.4
The court pointed out that these students had not paid taxes on any
property and had not otherwise acted as townspeople. This seems to be
begging the question, for taxes, militia duty, and other obligations are de-
manded only of community members. Anyone who pays these taxes and
serves in the militia tends collaterally to demonstrate his place in the com-
munity. But, in order to decide whether or not these taxes ought to be
paid and these services ought to be rendered, the court must decide
whether the person is a community member. Therefore, a different
approach will have to be taken in utilizing "residence" to demonstrate
community membership.
Certain assumptions must be made. In Massachusetts, where the advis-
ory opinion is utilized, the House of Representatives asked if residence at
a public institution in the Commonwealth for the sole purpose of obtain-
ing an education would be a residence within the meaning of the Consti-
tution, so as to give a person who has his means of support from another
place a right to vote, or subject him to the liability to pay taxes in the
town.5 In constructing the framework of an answer the Supreme Judicial
Cover advised:
Certain maxims on this subject we consider to be well settled, which afford
some aid in ascertaining one's domicil. 6 These are, that every person has a
2 See generally Bernard, Election Laws 68 (1950) (Chart I: Minimum Periods of
Residence for Voting Purposes).
378 I1. 170 (1875).
41d. at 182.
5 Opinion of the Justices, 46 Mass. 587 (1843) (Advisory opinion).
6 There is no good reason to equate "residence" to "domicile" as did the Justices. The
discussion which follows by the Court of Appeals of Maryland is most enlightening.
"But there is, it seems to us, a broad distinction between domicile, in a legal and
technical sense, by which one's civil status and the rights of persons and property
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domicil somewhere; and no person can have more than one domicil at the same
time, for one and the same purpose. It follows, from these maxims, that a man
retains his domicil of origin till he changes it, by acquiring another. And it is
equally obvious, that the acquisition of a new domicil does, at the same instant,
terminate the preceding one. 7
It seems fair to assume that a person is a member of some community on a
given community level. 8 He retains that community membership until he
abandons it and gains another inconsistent with it.° His membership in the
community does not depend on the extent of his participation in its
affairs.10
Because of these assumptions, the vote of an otherwise qualified person
who has never left the town of his birth is never challenged. But the man
who attempts to vote in a district (or state, or both) other than where he
was born raises the question of whether there has been a change of resi-
dence to the new district.
Although, theoretically, a person could have ties to a community in
which he has never set foot, strong considerations support the notion that
only a person who is physically present can acquire "residence." As the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said:
The objects intended to be secured by the constitutional limitation of the
right of suffrage to the town in which the voter has his home, were opportunity
to ascertain the qualifications of the voter, and the prevention of fraud upon
the public by multiplying the votes of the same person."
Physical presence as the sole test of residence would totally disregard
community membership. Visitors and intruders must be distinguished
are determined, and the residence required by the Constitution as a qualification for
the exercise of political rights. 'Domicile' in a legal sense, has, as we all know, a fixed
and definite meaning, and yet the word domicile is nowhere to be found in the Consti-
tution. In prescribing the qualifications of voters ... the person must be a 'resident' or
must 'reside' for the time specified within the State or county. The object in thus pre-
scribing residence as a qualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage, was not
merely for the purpose of identifying the voter and as a protection against fraud,
but also that he should become in fact a member of the community, and as such have
a common interest in all matters pertaining to its government. The framers of the
Constitution were dealing with the question of residence for political purposes, and
which although analogous in many respects, is not to be understood in the same sense
as domicile in law by which the rights of persons and property are governed." Shaeffer
v. Gilbert, 73 Md. 66, 70-71, 20 At. 434, 435 (1890).
7 Id. at 589. 8 Refer to note 1, supra.
9 These acts are not correlative. Conceivably a man could abandon his old residence
and skip about from one new residence to another, not remaining in any one new resi-
dence long enough to perfect political status or tax liability.
10 Thus even a modern-day Simon Stylytes, living on his pillar in an American desert,
would be allowed to vote.
11 Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488, 502 (1813).
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from community members. Thus "residence" must include the abstract
factors involved in the mental disposition (animus) of the community
member. Physical presence coupled with the proper disposition for the
required length of time would constitute "residence."
The exact constituents of the disposition for community membership
have remained the interests of social scientists, but courts have been con-
cerned at least with the intentions of the party claiming residence.12
In Dale v. Erwin the court looked upon a residence as "a home which
the party is at liberty to leave, as interest or whim may dictate, but with-
out any present intention to change it.' u 3
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of Pedigo v. Grimesx4
allowed the votes of students who entered the State University at Bloom-
ington, subsequently determining that it should be their residence. The
court commented that if the individuals had gone to Bloomington with
the intention of remaining simply as students they would not have ac-
quired a residence without a change of intention. The court pointed out
that "Where, however, the intention is formed to make the college town
the place of residence, and that place is selected as the domicile, then the
person who does this in good faith becomes a qualified voter."'15
Another court faced with a similar problem suggested the following
test in the case of Shaeffer v. Gilbert:'
... [T]he question is what is the meaning, and what is necessary to constitute
"residence" as thus used in the Constitution? It does not mean, as we have said,
one's permanent place of abode, where he intends to live all his days, or for an
indefinite or unlimited time; nor does it mean one's residence for a temporary
purpose, with the intention of returning to his former residence when that
purpose shall have been accomplished, but means, as we understand it one's
actual bome in the sense of having no other home, whether he intends to reside
there permanently, or for a definite or indefinite length of time .... And to ac-
quire such residence, that is, residence by choice, one must remove to this
State, or being an actual resident of the State, he must remove from one county
to another, with the bona fide intention of abandoning his former place of resi-
dence, and of making this State or the county to which he removes his actual
home for a definite or an indefinite period of time; and if with such intention
he continues to reside in the county to which he was removed, for the length
of time prescribed by the Constitution, he is entitled to be registered as a
voter. 17
12 See, e.g., Hall v. Shoenecke, 128 Mo. 661, 31 S.W. 97 (1895).
13 78 I11. 170, 181 (1875). See previous discussion.
14 113 Ind. 148, 13 N.E. 700 (1877). 15Id. at 151-52, 13 N.E. at 702.
1673 Md. 66, 20 Atl. 434 (1890).
17 Id. at 71, 20 Ad. at 435. See also People v. Osborn, 170 Mich. 143, 135 N.W. 921
(1912); Hall v. Schoenecke, 128 Mo. 661, 31 S.W. 97 (1895); Chomeau v. Roth, 230
Mo. App. 709, 718, 72 S.W. 2d 997, 999 (1934); Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. St. 302, 309
(1872); Siebold v. Wahl, 164 Wis. 82, 87, 159 N.W. 546, 548 (1916) (concurring
opinion).
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It seems that an intention to remain forever, except for temporary so-
journs and in the absence of unforseen circumstances, is wholly consistent
with the disposition for residence. It also seems that the legislatures have
provided the measure of time necessary for acceptance into the com-
munity. Thus, assuming that a given statute prescribed a one-year resi-
dence period, if a person has abandoned his former residence (also a mat-
ter of disposition) and is physically present in the new place for one year,
having had the intention to remain, except for unforseen circumstances
and temporary sojourns, for one year, he shows a residence in the new
place to which the usual assumptions will apply.'
The difficult problem is deciding whether the former residence has been
abandoned. Since sentimental men who intend to return to the boyhood
farm town at their retirement from the railroad are not questioned as
prospective voters when otherwise qualified, and since formal education
commonly consumes more time than residence laws prescribe, the answer
to the question of abandonment lies not in the intention to return to a
former residence but in other circumstances. In an appropriate case indica-
tions that the former residence has been retained might be maintenance of
sleeping facilities, storage of personal belongings, or unemancipation from
the parental family.19
Constitutional and statutory provisions in forty-three states provide, in
substance, that for purposes of voting no person shall be deemed to have
gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence while a
student at any institution of learning. 20 These laws could be interpreted
to mean that no student could ever effect a change of residence, because
the requisite physical presence could never be the physical presence of
18 The physical presence and the disposition must coexist. Berry v. Wilcox, 44 Neb.
82, 89, 62 N.W. 249, 251 (1895). But the proper disposition can later unite with physical
presence begun before. Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind. 148, 153, 13 N.E. 700, 702 (1887).
Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 46 Mass. 587, 589 (1843) (Advisory opinion).
1 See Ashbar v. Wahl, 164 Wis. 89, 159 N.W. 549 (1916).
"We have the situation here of a student in one of the departments of the university
whose work is, in the natural order of things, at the end of a college course; entirely
emancipated from his family for a long period of time; earning his own living and
exercising the right of voting elsewhere than at the home of his parents and thereby
necessarily claiming a home other than with such parents; no returning to the home
of his parents after temporary absence therefrom, and further, with no present intention
of returning to his former residence ... ." Id. at 90, 159 N.W. at 550. But see Anderson
v. Pifer, 315 I11. 164, 146 N.E. 171 (1925).
"The fact that a student does not expect to return home after he finishes school
is not a very important one, for most persons expect, when they graduate, to enter
some kind of business for themselves." Id. at 168, 146 N.E. at 173.
20 See generally 37 A.L.R. 138 (1923) (Annotation). For the constitutional provisions
see Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Constitutions of the United States (2 vols.)
(1962).
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anyone who was attending an institution of learning.21 This interpretation
clearly violates the public policy of wide distribution of the ballot, and
fails to further the legislative purpose for the residence laws: Identifica-
tion of the community member. Instead this interpretation avoids any
distinction between the "Joe College" of popular conception and the busi-
ness man who takes "brush-up" classes on Sunday mornings. In the case
of People v. Osborn,22 the court posed the hypothetical example of the
college student, with many ties to the parental family and home, whose
parents and family all move to the college town. The court was compelled
to reject the interpretation excluding the student because, to the court,
such a result in the hypothetical instance would be irrational.23 Rather
these laws should be read as warnings from the lawmakers that, in their
opinion, many school "kids" are mischievous rascals who might find dis-
ruption of local politics a diverting pastime, and that many students main-
tain the appearances of a new residence without abandoning the old one.
Perhaps this is what the Supreme Court of Louisiana had in mind when
it declared:
The accepted rule seems to be that the effect of such a constitutional provi-
sion is not to disqualify a student from gaining or losing a residence at the seat
of the institution he is attending, but to render his presence at or absence from
the institution primarily without effect as to his political status .... 24
In the decision In re Ward,25 the court pointed out that this interpreta-
tion was clearly the intent of the framers of the provision as found in the
Dialogues of the Constitutional Convention of 1867. The court further
commented:
It would seem that this the sensible and proper way to regard this consti-
tutional provision, and any other interpretation would give to a person who has
no desire to learn how to read and write, and who moves from place to place,
the right to acquire a residence for voting, and debar the student, ambitious to
perfect his knowledge upon all subjects within the mental grasp, from the right
to vote on questions of political importance which he appreciates keenly, and
which he is training his mind to understand more fully.2
6
21 This seems to have been the underlying attitude in Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. St.
302 (1872) snubbing "vague notions of liberty and personal rights, which often impress
the mind, and lead it to incline against what may seem to be a restraint." Id. at 311.
This case was regarded as "ancient" and thereby ignored in Berry v. Wilcox, 44 Neb. 82,
86, 62 (N.W. 249, 250 (1895).
22170 Mich. 143, 135 N.W. 921 (1912).
231 d. at 148, 135 N.W. at 923; approved in Attorney General ex rel Miller v. Miller,
266 Mich. 127, 253 N.W. 241 (1934).
24 Holmes v. Pino, 131 La. 687, 689, 60 So. 78, 78 (1912).
2520 N.Y.S. 606 (1892).
261d. at 610-11.
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Some courts, cautioned by these constitutional provisions and statutes,
and impressed by the "popular" conception of the student, have required
proof of acts independent of the stay as a student to establish the disposi-
tion necessary for residence.
This rule first was expressed in Matter of Goodman, 27 in the New York
Court of Appeals. Petitioner had not lived with his father for twelve years.
For seven years he had traveled in the West. He then moved into a room-
ing house in New York City. After a few months he entered Union Theo-
logical Seminary, taking a part-time job as a mission worker for a local
church group. While a student he found a new room nearer the Seminary.
The court denied his petition to register from the new address and sug-
gested that his residence was still in the first rooming house. The court
stated:
We do not mean to say that a voter may not change his legal residence into
a new district in spite of the fact that he becomes a student in an institution
of learning therein, but the facts to establish such a change must be wholly
independent and outside of his presence in the new district as a student, and
should be very clear and convincing to overcome the natural presumption....
The intention to change is not alone sufficient. It must exist, but must concur
with and be manifested by resultant acts which are independent of the presence
as a student in the new locality. It is only in quite exceptional cases that such a
result could be reached, and nothing in the one before us takes the situation
out of the constitutional rule.28
In a case that soon followed, the rule was assailed as harsh and unneces-
sary. To this the response was made: "It may be urged that the enforce-
ment of this rule will render it nigh impossible for a student to establish a
residence in a seminary of learning, but the very obvious answer is that
the letter and spirit of the Constitution contemplate such a result .... -29
Although any person who could show connections with the community
distinct from connections at a school30 would clearly qualify as a voter
(if the prior residence had been abandoned), some cases seem to have
made the rule the reason for the rule.
In Matter of Barry3 l and In re McCormack32 major seminarians at
Saint Joseph's, in Yonkers, were denied the ballot despite the fact that
27 146 N.Y. 284, 40 N.E. 769 (1895).
28 Id. at 287-88, 40 N.E. at 770.
29 Matter of Garvey, 147 N.Y. 117, 123, 41 N.E. 439, 441 (1895).
30 For as the Missouri Appellate Court has said:
"If . . .residence for voting purposes must have some connection or idenitfication
it could not better be evidenced than by a participation in the community's public affairs
by those who claim no other community as their residence." Chomeau v. Roth, 230
Mo. App. 709, 719, 72 S.W.2d 997, 999 (1934).
31 164 N.Y. 18, 58 N.E. 12 (1900). 3286 App. Div. 362, 83 N.Y.S. 847 (1903).
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they had renounced their former residences expressly as a prerequisite to
admission.
Members of the Franciscan Order, bound by its rule in all matters,
while preparing for ordination, were turned away. The court said:
If they continue as students until ordained as priests, during their residence
at the seminary as such, their status is clearly fixed, and under the Constitution
they cannot during such studentship acquire a residence which entitles them to
registration in the district where they make their sojourn.33
The New York Court of Appeals carried the rule furthest by holding
that even though abandonment of the former residence was established by
independent acts (letters to various officials) other independent acts would
have to be shown to establish the acquisition of a new residence.3 4
However when Columbia University established "Shanks Village" to
accommodate student veterans who had families, a protracted controversy
ensued over voting in the local election district. The trial court 5 and the
appellate division,3 6 while deciding that wives and parents of students,
living with them, must be allowed to vote, firmly stated that the students
themselves were not so entitled. The Court of Appeals reversed the case of
Robbins v. Chamberlain with these remarks:
Our Constitution and our statutes, for sufficient reasons, have decreed that
those who attend colleges and seminaries away from their family homes and
live in college residential halls during the college year in the fashion conven-
tional before the war, do not, thereby and without more, become qualified to
vote in the communities in whose life and doings these students had so limited
a part and so limited an interest. The mischief against which the law was aimed
was the participation of an unconcerned body of men in the control through
the ballot-box of municipal affairs in whose further conduct they have no
interest, and from the mismanagement of which by the officers their ballots
might elect, they sustain no injury.3 7 . . . However, that old concept of semi-
cloistered college life has little to do with the way these petitioners are getting
their education. They are married men who have left their parental firesides
and gone out on their own, with their wives and children. Their living arrange-
ments at Shanks Village bear small resemblance to an old-fashioned college
community, but are more like the kind of new-fashioned company-owned
housing projects, which great industries build near their factories to attract and
serve their employees and their employees' families. These students are family
men, not college boys away from their parental homes. True, their tenure of
occupancy at Shanks Village can continue only while they are students, but,
33 In re Gardiner, 101 Misc. 414, 424, 167 N.Y.S. 26, 31 (1917).
34 In re Blankford, 241 N.Y. 180, 149 N.E. 415 (1925). See also In re Foster, 123 Misc.
852, 206 N.Y.S. 853 (1924), which turned on the fact that the applications were filed late,
but approved in general terms of the above cases.
35 189 Misc. 1020, 76 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1947).
36 272 App. Div. 1034, 74 N.Y.S. 2d (1947).
37 Citing Silvey v. Lindsay, 107 N.Y. 55, 60, 13 N.E. 444, 446 (1887).
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since they have no other homes, their tenure is "temporary" or "indefinite"
only in the same sense as the tenure of the occupant of a city apartment
house.88
Without the "independent acts" rule the Robbins case would not have
seemed so revolutionary. Yet the case was properly decided in the light
of public policy and the purpose of the election laws. The rule ought not
be used in the cases to follow. 9 Rather the courts should decide future
cases involving students by distinguishing community members from
others by the residence requirement according to the public policy of a
society striving to achieve democratic ideals.
The worst fears of the well-entrenched citizenry will not be realized.
The great mass of collegiate "intruders" will not qualify to vote so as to
use the local policies as a diversion or sport. But no person will be "dis-
franchised" because he chooses to obtain an education.
Allen 1. Hoover
38 297 N.Y. 108, 111-12, 75 NE.2d 617, 618 (1947).
39 The rule appeared since Robbins in New York in the Application of People ex rel
Singer, 118 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1952), accompanied by a soulful apology to the spurned voters
and an appeal to the orderliness of legal institutions. (This decision was affirmed by
a series of memoranda, 282 App. Div. 919, 125 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1952).)
